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  INTRODUCTION	  In	  February	  2010,	   the	  Alzheimer’s	   Institute	   of	  America	   (AIA)	   filed	   a	  patent	   infringement	   lawsuit	   against	   Jackson	   Laboratory,	   the	   largest	  repository	  of	  research	  mice	  in	  the	  world.1	   	  AIA	  sued	  Jackson	  Laboratory	  for	   infringing	   on	   AIA’s	   patent	   covering	   a	   DNA	   mutation	   linked	   to	  Alzheimer’s	   disease.2	   	   Jackson	   Lab	   allegedly	   violated	   that	   patent	   by	  distributing	  mice	  especially	  bred	  for	  Alzheimer’s	  research.3	  
 1. 	  See	  National	  Institutes	  of	  Health	  Intervenes	  to	  End	  Patent	  Infringement	  Suit	  Against	  the	  
Jackson	   Laboratory	   Concerning	   Alzheimer’s	   Disease	   Research	   Mouse	   Models,	   INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	  TODAY	  (Sep.	  23,	  2011),	  www.iptoday.com.	  	  2. 	  Id.	  3. 	  Id.	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AIA	  also	  sued	  a	  number	  of	  other	  parties	  for	  infringing	  upon	  this	  same	  patent.	   However,	   in	   August	   2011,	   only	   the	   case	   against	   Jackson	  Laboratory	   was	   dismissed.4	   	   What	   caused	   the	   dismissal	   of	   the	   lawsuit	  against	   Jackson	   Laboratory?	   	   The	   answer	   is	   simple:	   the	   National	  Institutes	  of	  Health	  (NIH)	  had	  funded	  Jackson	  Laboratory’s	  research	  with	  the	   mice	   in	   question	   since	   2003.5	   	   And	   due	   to	   the	   NIH’s	   significant	  interest	   in	   the	   research,	   it	   retroactively	   granted	   Jackson	   Laboratory	  authorization	  and	  consent	  to	  distribute	  the	  mice.6	  It	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   why	   Jackson	   Laboratory,	   and	   arguably	   the	   public,	  benefited	   from	   NIH’s	   rare	   decision	   to	   intervene.7	   	   Currently,	   the	   NIH	  holds	   various	   patent	   rights	   that	   date	   back	   to	   the	   federal	   government’s	  long-­‐term	   vision	   of	   the	   agency.8	   	   Many	   of	   these	   rights	   come	   from	   the	  amendments	   to	   the	   Patent	   and	   Trademark	   Act,	   or	   more	   commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act.9	  Today,	  it	  seems	  like	  this	  vision	  falls	  seamlessly	  in	  line	  with	  the	  NIH’s	  broader	   goals	   within	   the	   medical	   research	   community.	   	   For	   example,	  Francis	   Collins,	   the	  Director	   of	   the	  NIH,	   released	   a	   letter	   explaining	   the	  agency’s	  decision	  to	  support	  Jackson	  Laboratory	  against	  the	  infringement	  suit.10	   	  He	  stated	  that	  it	  was	  not	  only	  to	  aid	  Jackson	  Laboratory,	  but	  also	  to	   effectuate	   the	   NIH’s	   broader	   policy	   on	   access	   to	   research	   tools.11	  	  Specifically	  he	  stated,	  “[t]his	  is	  great	  news	  not	  only	  for	  those	  involved	  in	  Alzheimer’s	   disease	   research,	   but	   for	   the	   entire	   biomedical	   research	  community	  .	  .	  .	   [a]t	   [the]	   NIH,	   we	   believe	   that	   science	   advances	   most	  rapidly	  when	  new	  technologies	  and	  research	  tools	  resulting	  from	  federal	  
 4. 	  Id.	  5. 	  Id.	  6. 	   See	   Letter	   from	   Francis	   S.	   Collins,	   Director,	   National	   Institutes	   of	   Health,	   to	   David	  Einhorn,	   House	   Counsel,	   The	   Jackson	   Laboratory	   (Jun.	   17,	   2011)	   (on	   file	   with	   the	   National	  Institutes	  of	  Health)	  [hereinafter	  Letter	  from	  Francis	  S.	  Collins].	  7. 	   The	   public	   has	   a	   significant	   interest	   in	   scientific	   research	   and	   development	   of	   a	  disease	   that	   currently	   does	   not	   have	   a	   cure	   and	   affects	   millions	   of	   Americans	   daily.	   	   See	  http://www.alz.org/	   (5.4	  million	  Americans	   are	   currently	   living	  with	  Alzheimer’s.).	   	  See	   also	  CENTERS	   FOR	   DISEASE	   CONTROL	   AND	   PREVENTION,	   Alzheimer’s	   Disease,	  http://www.cdc.gov/Features/Alzheimers/.	  8. 	  See	  generally,	  Mary	  Eberle,	  Comment:	  March-­‐In	  Rights	  Under	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act:	  Public	  
Access	  to	  Federally	  Funded	  Research,	  3	  MARQ.	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  L.	  REV.	  155	  (1999).	  9. 	  WENDY	   H.	   SCHACHT,	   CONG.	   RESEARCH	   SERV.,	   RL	   32076,	   THE	   BAYH-­‐DOLE	   ACT:	   SELECTED	  ISSUES	   IN	   PATENT	   POLICY	   AND	   THE	   COMMERCIALIZATION	   OF	   TECHNOLOGY	   (2011)	   (stating	   that	   the	  government’s	  “interest	  in	  facilitating	  U.S.	  technological	  innovation	  led	  to	  the	  passage	  of	  P.L.	  96-­‐517,	   amendments	   to	   the	  Patent	  and	  Trademark	  Act	   (commonly	   referred	   to	  as	   the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act	   after	   is	   two	  main	   sponsors.)”).	   	  Thus,	   throughout	   this	   article,	   the	  author	  will	   refer	   to	   the	  Amendments	  to	  the	  Patent	  and	  Trademark	  Act	  as	  the	  “Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act.”	  	  	  10. 	  See	  Letter	  from	  Francis	  S.	  Collins,	  supra	  note	  6.	  11. 	  Id.	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funding	  are	  made	  available	  to	  others.”12	  In	   addition	   to	   having	   some	   authority	   over	   patents,	   the	   NIH	   has	   an	  underlying	  mission	  to	  uncover	  new	  knowledge	  that	  will	  lead	  to	  improved	  public	  health.13	   	  The	  Office	  of	  Technology	  Transfer,	  under	  the	  NIH,	  has	  a	  primary	   function	   to	   transition	  basic	  medical	  research	   into	  commercially	  successful	   inventions	   that	   will	   improve	   public	   health.14	   	   With	   such	   a	  stated	   mission,	   the	   NIH	   does	   not	   take	   this	   responsibility	   lightly	   and	   is	  heavily	  involved	  in	  balancing	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  public	  with	  those	  of	  the	  private	  sector.15	  It	   is	   with	   this	   backdrop	   that	   this	   Comment	   analyzes	   the	   recent	  Supreme	   Court	   case	   Board	   of	   Trustees	   of	   Leland	   Stanford	   University	   v.	  
Roche	  Molecular	  Systems,	   Inc.	   (Stanford	  v.	  Roche).16	   	   In	  Stanford	  v.	  Roche,	  the	  Court	  sets	   forth	  an	   interpretation	  of	   the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act	  with	  regards	  to	   patent	   ownership	   and	   holds	   that	   patent	   ownership	   can	   vest	   beyond	  the	   initial	   recipient	   of	   federal	   funding.17	   	   This	   Comment	   discusses	   the	  dissenting	   viewpoint	   set	   forth	   by	   Justice	   Breyer,	   who	   claimed	   that	   the	  majority’s	  holding	  will	  adversely	  affect	  the	  carefully	  thought-­‐out	  balance	  of	   interests	   between	   the	   public	   and	   private	   sector.18	   	   This	   Comment	  agrees	   with	   the	   dissenting	   opinion	   in	   Stanford	   v.	   Roche	   and	   seeks	   to	  assuage	   Justice	  Breyer’s	   concern	  over	   this	   balance	  of	   interests	   by	  using	  the	   NIH	   as	   an	   example	   of	   how	   the	   government	   is	   actively	   seeking	   to	  balance	  this	  interest,	  even	  if	  the	  Court	  is	  not.	  Section	  II	  of	  this	  Comment	  will	  discuss	  the	  historical	  rationale	  behind	  creating	  the	  NIH	  and	  its	  enabling	  authority.	  	  Specifically,	  this	  Section	  will	  delve	  into	  the	  two	  opposing	  viewpoints	   leading	  up	  to	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act.	   	  Section	  III	  will	  briefly	  discuss	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act	  and	  the	  implications	   the	   Act	   has	   on	   the	   NIH’s	   patent	   authority.	   	   Section	   IV	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  recent	  Supreme	  Court	  decision	  in	  Stanford	  v.	  Roche.	  	  Finally,	  Section	   V	   of	   this	   Comment	   will	   argue	   that	   Justice	   Breyer’s	   dissenting	  opinion	   in	   Stanford	   v.	   Roche	   highlights	   an	   important	   public	   interest	  viewpoint	   on	   patent	   ownership.	   	   This	   Section	   will	   then	   argue	   that	   this	  
 12. 	  Id.	  	  13. 	  See	  UNITED	  STATES	  DEPARTMENT	  OF	  HEALTH	  AND	  HUMAN	  SERVICES,	  NATIONAL	  INSTITUTES	  OF	  HEALTH,	  www.nih.gov	   (last	  visited	  February	  15,	  2012)	   [hereinafter	  NATIONAL	   INSTITUTES	  OF	  HEALTH].	   See	   also	   UNITED	   STATES	   DEPARTMENT	   OF	   HEALTH	   AND	   HUMAN	   SERVICES,	   NATIONAL	  INSTITUTES	  OF	  HEALTH,	  OFFICE	  OF	  TECHNOLOGY	  TRANSFER,	  www.ott.nih.gov	  (last	  visited	  February	  15,	  2012)	  [hereinafter	  OFFICE	  OF	  TECHNOLOGY	  TRANSFER].	  14. 	  OFFICE	  OF	  TECHNOLOGY	  TRANSFER,	  supra	  note	  13.	  	  15. 	  Id.	  16. 	  Bd.	  of	  Trs.	  of	  Leland	  Stanford	  Univ.	  v.	  Roche	  Molecular	  Sys.,	  131	  S.	  Ct.	  2188	  (2011).	  17. 	  Id.	  at	  2196.	  18. 	  Id.	  at	  2200–02.	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viewpoint	   is	   a	   valid	   public	   policy	   concern	   that	   could	   tip	   the	   carefully	  balanced	   interests	   between	   the	   public	   and	   private	   sector,	   which	   are	  currently	  in	  place	  to	  facilitate	  patent	  innovation.	   	  This	  Section	  will	   lastly	  use	   the	   NIH	   to	   exemplify	   how	   the	   government	   uses	   existing	   statutory	  authority	  to	  balance	  this	  public-­‐private	  interest.	  II.	  	  HISTORICAL	  BACKGROUND	  OF	  THE	  NATIONAL	  INSTITUTES	  OF	  HEALTH	  AND	  PATENT	  AUTHORITY	  The	  NIH	  received	  its	  enabling	  authority	  from	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Public	  Health	   Service	   Act	   (PHS	   Act).19	   	   Throughout	   the	   1930s,	   the	   federal	  government	  began	  granting	  funds	  to	  states	  and	  local	  health	  departments	  and	   expanded	   their	   involvement	   throughout	   national	   health	   care.20	  	  Congress	  initially	  passed	  the	  PHS	  Act	  in	  two	  pieces	  of	  legislation;	  first	  in	  1943	  and	  then	  in	  1944	  when	  it	  codified	  its	  authority	  and	  strengthened	  its	  role.21	   	   Functioning	   through	   four	   main	   authorities:	   “the	   Office	   of	   the	  Surgeon	   General,	   the	   National	   Institute	   of	   Health,	   a	   new	   Bureau	   of	  Medical	  Services,	  and	  a	  new	  Bureau	  of	  State	  Services,”22	  the	  PHS	  Act	  was	  the	   first	   piece	   of	   legislation	   unifying	   already	   existing	   programs	   and	  federal	   activities	   into	   a	   “linear	   relationship	   between	   investment	   in	   the	  supply	   of	   knowledge	   and	   health	   services	   and	   [the]	   reduction	   in	   the	  burden	  of	  disease.”23	  	  It	  essentially	  set	  up	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  public	  health	  in	  the	  United	  States.24	  
A.	  	  Two	  Decades	  of	  Careful	  Planning	  Created	  the	  National	  Institutes	  of	  
Health	  Before	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  public	  health	  officials	  began	  laying	  the	  groundwork	   for	   a	   postwar	  medical	   research	   effort.25	   	   Thus,	   during	   the	  1930s,	   the	   NIH	   worked	   hard	   to	   be	   a	   part	   of	   that	   effort.26	   	   Congress	  
 19. 	  See	   Lynne	  Page	  Snyder,	  Passage	  and	  Significance	  of	   the	  1944	  Public	  Health	  Service	  
Act,	  109	  PUBLIC	  HEALTH	  REPORTS	  721	  at	  723	  (1944).	  20. 	  Id.	  	  21. 	  Id.	  at	  723.	  22. 	  Lynne	  Page	  Snyder,	  A	  New	  Mandate	   for	  Public	  Health,	  109	  PUBLIC	  HEALTH	  REPORTS	  469,	  469	  (1944).	  23. 	   Daniel	  M.	   Fox,	  The	   Public	  Health	   Service	   and	   the	  Nation’s	   Health	   Care	   in	   the	   Post-­‐
World	  War	  II	  Era,	  109	  PUBLIC	  HEALTH	  REPORTS	  725,	  725	  (1994).	   	  See	  Rebecca	  Goulding,	  et.	  al.,	  
Alternative	   Intellectual	   Property	   for	   Genomics	   and	   the	   Activity	   of	   Technology	   Transfer	   Offices:	  
Emerging	  Directions	  in	  Research,	  16	  B.U.	  J.	  SCI.	  &	  TECH.	  L.	  194,	  217–18	  (2010).	  	  24. 	  Snyder,	  supra	  note	  22,	  at	  471.	  25. 	   Donald	   C.	   Swain,	  The	   Rise	   of	   a	   Research	   Empire:	   NIH,	   1930	   to	   1950,	   SCIENCE,	   NEW	  SERIES,	  Dec.	  14,	  1962,	  at	  1233.	  26. 	   Donald	   S.	   Fredrickson,	   The	   National	   Institutes	   of	   Health	   Yesterday,	   Today,	   and	  
Tomorrow,	   93	   PUBLIC	   HEALTH	   REPORTS	   642,	   (1978);	   see	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   NATIONAL	   INSTITUTES	   OF	   HEALTH,	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carefully	  crafted	  legislation	  to	  provide	  maximum	  flexibility	  for	  the	  NIH.27	  	  While	  the	  PHS	  had	  initially	  proposed	  solely	  intramural	  research,	  research	  conducted	  by	  the	  agency’s	  own	  scientists	  and	  in	  their	  own	  laboratories,28	  other	   proposals	   believed	   that	   the	   government	   should	   limit	   its	   own	  research	   programs	   and	   award	   grants-­‐in-­‐aid	   to	   university	   scientists.29	  	  Slowly,	   this	   idea	   took	   off	   with	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   National	   Cancer	  Institute,	   which	   was	   the	   first	   institute	   to	   award	   grants-­‐in-­‐aid	   and	  fellowships	  to	  able	  researchers	  in	  institutions	  outside	  of	  the	  PHS.30	  	  This	  approach	  proved	   to	   be	   cost	   effective	   and	   successful	   as	   the	  NIH	  became	  “the	   principal	   biomedical	   and	   behavioral	   research	   agency	   within	   the	  Federal	   Government.”31	   	   Now,	   as	   the	   premier	   public	   health	   agency,	   the	  NIH	  was	  ready	  for	  more	  power,	  principally	  in	  the	  patent	  arena.	  	  
B.	  	  The	  Department	  of	  Health	  Education	  and	  Welfare	  Many	  post	  World	  War	   II	  U.S.	  presidents	  attempted	   to	  unify	  a	  patent	  policy	   across	   federal	   agencies,	   however,	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   debate	   were	  compelling,	  and	  Congress	  could	  not	  agree.32	   	  Thus,	  agencies	   followed	  ad	  hoc	   patent	   titles	   and	   licensing	   for	   many	   years.33	   	   The	   Department	   of	  Health,	  Education,	  and	  Welfare	  (HEW)34	  was	  one	  of	   the	   first	  agencies	   to	  negotiate	  an	  agreement	  with	  universities	  regarding	  technology	  transfer.35	  	  These	   agreements	   were	   known	   as	   Institutional	   Patent	   Agreements.36	  	  HEW	  specifically	  wanted	   to	  grant	   exclusive	  patent	   licenses	  and	  was	   the	  first	   agency	   to	   do	   so	   absent	   explicit	   statutory	   authority.37	   	   Under	   the	  financial	  umbrella	  of	  HEW,	  the	  NIH	  also	  granted	  patent	  titles	  in	  a	  similar	  fashion.38	   	   This	   approach	   to	   technology	   transfer	   of	   information	   was	  significant	  because	  the	  NIH	  controlled	  “nearly	  half	  of	  all	  federal	  financing	  
 
supra	  note	  13.	  27. 	  Fredrickson	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  643.	  28. 	  Id.	  at	  646.	  29. 	  Id.	   	  See	  Gil	  Van	  Bokkelen,	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  Federal	  Government	  in	  Overseeing	  Medical	  
Research,	  20	  J.L.	  &	  HEALTH	  299,	  300–04,	  (2006).	  	  	  	  30. 	  Id.	  31. 	   Id.	   	   See	  OFFICE	   OF	   TECHNOLOGY	   TRANSFER,	   supra	   note	   13.	   	   See	   also	   Deepak	   Hegde,	  
Political	   Influence	   Behind	   the	   Veil	   of	   Peer	   Review:	   An	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   of	   Public	   Biomedical	   Research	  
Funding	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  52	  J.	  LAW	  &	  ECON.	  665	  (2009).	  32. 	   White	   Paper,	   The	   Bayh-­‐Dole	   Act	   at	   25,	   19	   (Apr.	   17,	   2006),	  http://www.bayhdolecentral.com/BayhDole25_WhitePaper.pdf	  [hereinafter	  White	  Paper].	  33. 	  Id.	  34. 	  Id.	  (The	  HEW	  is	  currently	  the	  Department	  of	  Health	  and	  Human	  Services).	  35. 	  Id.	  36. 	  Id.	  37. 	  Id.	  at	  13.	  38. 	  Id.	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of	  academic	  research.”39	  	  Eventually,	  the	  HEW	  became	  a	  premier	  example	  of	  how	  the	  government	  could	  facilitate	  patent	  innovation	  that	  benefitted	  both	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors.	  
C.	  	  Two	  Opposing	  Perspectives:	  The	  Bush-­‐Kilgore	  Debates	  During	   the	   debates	   prior	   to	   the	   passage	   of	   the	   Bayh-­‐Dole	   Act,	   the	  conversation	  focused	  on	  whether	  the	  government	  should	  have	  a	  uniform	  patent	  policy	  and	  who	  should	  primarily	  retain	  title	   to	  patents	   that	  were	  discovered	  in	  part	  through	  the	  use	  of	  public	  funding.40	  	  Prior	  to	  1980,	  the	  government	   maintained	   full	   control	   of	   all	   patents	   resulting	   from	  government	  sponsored	  research.41	   	  Although	  this	  approach	  ensured	  that	  patents	  would	  be	  available	  to	  the	  public	  and	  fall	  in	  line	  with	  the	  goals	  of	  the	   PHS	   Act	   and	   the	   NIH,	   this	   approach	   prevented	   federally	   financed	  technology	  to	  translate	  into	  successful	  commercial	  products.42	  	  This	  often	  stifled	  innovation,	  and	  it	  was	  thought	  that	  “public	  ownership	  of	  research	  results	   was	   equivalent	   to	   ‘dead-­‐hand’	   control,	   and	   [that]	   the	   public	  domain	   was	   a	   treacherous	   quicksand	   pit	   in	   which	   discoveries	   [sunk]	  beyond	  reach	  of	  the	  private	  sector.”43	  	  Without	  a	  uniform	  policy	  across	  all	  agencies,	   the	   government	   “lacked	   a	   consistent	   approach	   to	  determining	  who	  held	  clear	  title	  to	  federally-­‐financed	  research.”44	  Congress	   had	   been	   debating	   this	   issue	   for	   decades;	   however,	   the	  concerns	   over	   agreeing	   on	   a	   uniform	   government	   patent	   policy	   were	  becoming	   more	   pertinent	   due	   to	   a	   “massive	   expansion	   of	   federal	  [research	   and	   development]	   during	   World	   War	   II,	   [where]	   patents	  [became]	   a	   central	   point	   of	   contention	  during	   the	  Bush-­‐Kilgore	  debates	  over	  the	  shape	  of	  .	  .	  .	  science	  and	  technology	  policy.”45	  One	  prominent	  side	  of	  the	  debate	  was	  led	  by	  Senator	  Harley	  Kilgore,	  a	  representative	   from	   West	   Virginia.46	   	   He	   believed	   and	   emphatically	  
 39. 	  Id.	  40. 	   Bhaven	   N.	   Sampat,	  Patenting	   and	   US	   Academic	   Research	   in	   the	   20th	   Century:	   The	  
World	  Before	  and	  After	  Bayh-­‐Dole,	  35	  RESEARCH	  POLICY	  772,	  777	  (2006).	  	  See	  generally,	  SCHACHT,	  
supra	  note	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   (“cited	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   companies	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   of	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   exclusive	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   or	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  tend	  to	  be	  less	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  to	  engage	  in	  related	  R&D.”)	  41. 	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  Paper,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  12.	  42. 	  Id.	  at	  10.	  43. 	  Rebecca	  S.	  Eisenberg,	  Symposium,	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  Research	  and	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  Development:	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and	  Technology	  Transfer	  in	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  82	  VA.	  L.	  REV.	  1663,	  1664	  (1996).	  44. 	  White	   Paper,	   supra	   note	   32;	  See	  Edward	  C.	  Walterscheid,	   The	  Need	   for	   a	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Government	  Patent	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  The	  D.O.E.	  Example,	  3	  HARV.	  J.L.	  &	  TECH.	  103	  (1990).	  45. 	  Sampat,	  supra	  note	  40,	  at	  777.	  46. 	  For	  further	  explanation	  on	  Senator	  Kilgore’s	  position	  see	  Robert	  F.	  Maddox,	  Senator	  
Harley	  M.	  Kilgore	  and	  Japan's	  World	  War	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argued	   that	   titles	   to	   patents	   should	   be	   retained	   by	   the	   federal	  government	   when	   funded	   with	   federal	   research	   dollars;	   that	   way	   they	  would	  primarily	  be	  kept	   in	   the	   interest	  of	   the	  public	  domain.47	   	  Senator	  Kilgore’s	  main	  concern	  with	   large	  corporations	  retaining	  title	  to	  patents	  was	   that	   taxpayers	   would	   be	   “double	   taxed”.	   	   Essentially,	   taxpayers’	  dollars	  are	  used	  to	  develop	  federally	  funded	  patents,	  and	  then	  taxpayers	  pay	  again	  as	  a	  consumer	  once	  the	  patents	  are	  commercialized.48	  	  Instead,	  with	  patent	   titles	   retained	   in	   the	  government	  domain,	   the	  public	  would	  benefit	  without	  being	  “double	  taxed.”49	  Vannevar	   Bush,	   the	   Director	   of	   the	   Wartime	   Office	   of	   Scientific	  Research	  and	  Development,	  held	   the	  opposing	  argument.50	   	  He	   strongly	  believed	  that	  technology	  and	  innovation	  played	  a	  critical	  part	  in	  the	  war	  effort	  and,	  particularly,	  in	  winning	  the	  war.51	  	  In	  1945,	  Bush	  presented	  a	  report	   to	   Congress,	   which	   was	   a	   request	   from	   President	   Roosevelt,	  detailing	   his	   “support	   of	   basic	   science	   to	   the	   goal	   of	   stimulating	   the	  economy.”52	  	  His	  position	  and	  influence	  led	  to	  strengthening	  agencies	  like	  the	  NIH,	  whose	  primary	  mission	  was	  to	  fund	  basic	  science	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	   the	   public	   domain.53	   	   Bush’s	   argument	   focused	   on	   retaining	   title	   to	  patents	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   contractors	   or	   individuals,	   even	   though	   the	  funding	   was	   backed	   by	   federal	   dollars.54	   	   He	   believed	   it	   would	   be	  beneficial	   to	   consumers	   to	   retain	   title	   in	   the	   private	   sector	   because	   it	  would	   otherwise	   be	   “difficult	   to	   attract	   qualified	   firms	   to	   perform	  government	   research.	  .	  .	  .”55	   	   Additionally,	   an	   “absence	   of	   title	   would	  reduce	   incentives	   to	   invest	   in	   commercial	   development	   of	   these	  inventions.”56	   	  This	  position	  eventually	  won	  and	  legislators	  were	  careful	  to	  craft	  the	  policy	  to	  balance	  the	  interests	  of	  both	  the	  public	  domain	  and	  private	  sector.	  
 47. Id.	  48. Id.	  49. Id.	  50. For	  further	  explanation	  on	  Vannevar	  Bush’s	  position	  see	  A	  REPORT	  TO	  THE	  PRESIDENT	  BY	  VANNEVAR	  BUSH,	  DIRECTOR	  OF	  THE	  OFFICE	  OF	  SCIENTIFIC	  RESEARCH	  AND	  DEVELOPMENT	  (1945).	  	  51. White	  Paper,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  8.	  52. Id.	  53. Id.	  54. Id.	  55. Sampat,	  supra	  note	  40,	  at	  777.	  	  	  56. Id.	   	   See	   Gary	   Pulsinelli,	   Share	   and	   Share	   Alike:	   Increasing	   Access	   to	   Government-­‐
Funded	  Inventions	  Under	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act,	  7	  MINN.	  J.L.	  SCI.	  &	  TECH.	  393,	  394	  (2006).	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III.	  	  THE	  BAYH-­‐DOLE	  ACT	  AND	  ITS	  IMPACT	  ON	  THE	  NATIONAL	  INSTITUTES	  OF	  HEALTH	  The	   Bayh-­‐Dole	   Act	   (Act)	   has	   a	   long,	   mired	   history	   and,	   as	   stated	  previously,	  had	  two	  very	  distinct	  viewpoints	  forming	  the	  debate	  prior	  to	  its	  passage.57	  	  Passed	  in	  1980,	  the	  country	  was	  at	  a	  distinct	  disadvantage	  in	   the	   technological	   arena.58	   	   The	   Act	   proved	   to	   be	   the	   nation’s	   most	  effective	   investment	   in	   technology	   transfer	   to	  date,	   and	   impacted	  many	  government	  agencies	  to	  facilitate	  new	  innovation.59	  
A.	  	  The	  National	  Institutes	  of	  Health	  and	  Its	  Patent	  Authority	  The	  NIH	  has	  broad	  discretion	   in	   its	  ability	   to	  manage	   its	   intellectual	  property	   rights.60	   	   The	   NIH	   can	   “invoke	   additional	   legal	   authorities	   for	  advancing	   its	   interest	   related	   to	   research	   tools,”	   and	   it	   can	   assist	   in	  improving	   access	   to	   research	   tools	   and	   ultimately	   patents	   in	   the	   public	  domain.61	   	   Specifically,	   the	   NIH	   has	   intramural	   authorities	   and	   grant	  authorities	  under	  the	  Act;	  all	  of	  which	  are	  given	  to	  any	  research	  oriented	  federal	  agency.62	  The	   Act	   sets	   out	   a	   framework	   for	   many	   government	   agencies,	  including	   the	   NIH,	   that	   are	   involved	   in	   technology	   transfer.	   	   It	   allows	  grantees	   of	   federal	   contracts	   to	   “elect	   title	   to	   patentable	   ‘subject	  inventions’	   that	   arise	   within	   the	   use	   of	   federal	   funds.”63	   	   Even	   if	   the	  grantee	  chooses	  to	  elect	  title	  to	  the	  invention,	  the	  federal	  agency	  still	  has	  residual	   rights	   to	   the	   subject	   inventions.64	   	   For	   example,	   the	   NIH	   can	  intervene	  and	  elect	  title	  itself	  or	  limit	  the	  grantees	  right	  to	  title	  if	   it	  sees	  fit	   under	   the	   circumstances.65	   	   Specifically,	   the	   NIH	   can	   intervene	   “in	  exceptional	   circumstances	   when	   it	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   agency	   that	  restriction	   or	   elimination	   of	   the	   right	   to	   retain	   title	   to	   any	   subject	  invention	  will	  better	  promote	  the	  policy	  and	  objectives.”66	   	  The	  primary	  purpose	   to	   use	   the	   power	   to	   elect	   in	   exceptional	   circumstances	   is	   to	  
 57. 	  See	  supra	  Section	  I	  C.	  58. 	  Statement	  of	  Senator	  Birch	  Bayh	  to	  the	  National	  Institutes	  of	  Health,	  May	  25,	  2004,	  
available	  at	  www.ott.nih.gov/policy/meeting/Senator-­‐Birch-­‐Bayh.pdf.	  	  59. 	  See	  Margo	  A.	  Bagley,	  Academic	  Disclosure	  and	  Proprietary	  Rights:	  Putting	  Patents	  in	  
their	  Proper	  Place,	  47	  B.C.	  L.	  REV	  217,	  220	  (2006).	  60. 	   REPORT	   OF	   THE	   NIH	  WORKING	   GROUP	   ON	   RESEARCH	   TOOLS,	   ANALYSIS	   OF	   NIH	   OPTIONS	  UNDER	  CURRENT	  LAW,	  PRESENTED	  TO	  THE	  ADVISORY	  COMMITTEE	  TO	  THE	  DIRECTOR	  (1998).	  	  61. 	  Id.	  	  62. 	  Id.	  63. 	  Id.	  64. 	  See	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  202	  (2006).	  	  	  65. 	  Id.	  66. 	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  202(a)	  (2006).	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promote	  the	  broad	  dissemination	  of	  research	  tools	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  public,	  however,	   the	  NIH	  has	  yet	   to	  utilize	   this	  power	  over	   inventions.67	  	  The	  NIH	  also	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  use	  any	  patented	  research	  tools	  that	  arise	  from	   federally	   sponsored	   research	   without	   the	   liability	   of	   patent	  infringement.68	  Under	   35	   U.S.C.	   section	   203,	   the	   Act	   provides	   government	   agencies	  with	   a	   “march-­‐in”	   authority	   or	   a	   mandatory	   licensing	   authority.69	   	   The	  primary	   purpose	   of	   this	   authority	   is	   to	   “prevent	   the	   underutilization	   of	  federally	  funded	  inventions.”70	   	  Again,	  this	  right	  only	  applies	  to	  research	  tools	   that	   are	   defined	   as	   patentable	   subject	   inventions,	   per	   statute	  language.71	   	  Although	  the	  right	  has	  a	  beneficial	  use	  to	   improve	  access	  to	  particular	   research	   tools,	   the	   process	   is	   cumbersome	   and	   thus	   seldom	  used.72	   	   Before	   exercising	   this	   right,	   the	   NIH	  must	   determine	   that	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	   intervene	   because	   the	   grantee	   or	   licensee	   has	   not	   taken	  proper	   steps	   to	   achieve	   a	   practical	   application	   of	   the	   invention	   in	   a	  particular	   field	   of	   use,	   to	   satisfy	   health	   or	   safety	   needs,	   or	   to	   meet	  requirements	  for	  public	  use	  specified	  by	  Federal	  regulations.73	  	  Although	  the	  triggers	  to	  permit	  an	  intervention	  seem	  broadly	  defined,	  “the	  NIH	  has	  only	  received	  march-­‐in	  petitions	   four	   times”	  and	  has	  yet	   to	  exercise	   the	  right.74	   	   The	   benefit	   of	   this	   right	   is	   that	   its	   power	   is	   utilized	   only	   if	   it	  would	  be	  beneficial	   to	  the	  government.75	   	  That	   is,	   the	  government	  could	  intervene	  so	  that	  a	  third	  party	  could	  license	  the	  patent	  and	  manufacture	  the	  product	  to	  make	  it	  available	  to	  the	  public	  domain.76	  There	  are	  many	  rights	  the	  NIH	  has	  apart	  from	  those	  proscribed	  under	  
 67. 	   REPORT	   OF	   THE	   NIH	  WORKING	   GROUP	   ON	   RESEARCH	   TOOLS,	   ANALYSIS	   OF	   NIH	   OPTIONS	  UNDER	  CURRENT	  LAW,	  PRESENTED	  TO	  THE	  ADVISORY	  COMMITTEE	  TO	  THE	  DIRECTOR	  (1998).	  68. 	  Id.	  69. 	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  203	  (2006).	  70. 	   REPORT	   OF	   THE	   NIH	  WORKING	   GROUP	   ON	   RESEARCH	   TOOLS,	   ANALYSIS	   OF	   NIH	   OPTIONS	  UNDER	  CURRENT	  LAW,	  PRESENTED	  TO	  THE	  ADVISORY	  COMMITTEE	  TO	  THE	  DIRECTOR	  (1998);	  Barbara	  M.	  McGarey	  &	   Annette	   C.	   Levey,	  Patents,	   Products,	   and	   Public	   Health:	   An	   Analysis	   of	   the	   CellPro	  
March-­‐In	  Petition,	  14	  BERKELEY	  TECH.	  L.J.	  1095,	  1104	  (1999).	  71. 	  Id.	  72. 	  Id.	  73. 	  See	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  203(a)(1)	  (2006).	  74. 	   John	   Conley,	  Government	   Refuses	   to	  March-­‐In	   Under	   Bayh-­‐Dole	   Act,	   GENOMICS	   LAW	  REPORT	   (Jan.	   18,	   2011),	  http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2011/01/18/government-­‐refuses-­‐to-­‐march-­‐in-­‐under-­‐bayh-­‐dole-­‐again/.	  75. 	   REPORT	   OF	   THE	   NIH	  WORKING	   GROUP	   ON	   RESEARCH	   TOOLS,	   ANALYSIS	   OF	   NIH	   OPTIONS	  UNDER	  CURRENT	  LAW,	  PRESENTED	  TO	  THE	  ADVISORY	  COMMITTEE	  TO	  THE	  DIRECTOR	  (1998).	  For	  further	  discussion	   on	  March-­‐in	  Rights	   under	  Bayh-­‐Dole	   see	   John	  H.	   Raubitschek	  &	  Norman	   J.	   Latker	  
Reasonable	  Pricing–A	  New	  Twist	   for	  March-­‐in	  Rights	  Under	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act,	  22	  SANTA	  CLARA	  COMPUTER	  &	  HIGH	  TECH.	  L.J.	  149,	  155–160	  (2005).	  76. 	  Id.	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the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act.	  	  One	  falls	  under	  28	  U.S.C.	  section	  1498,	  which	  provides	  a	  limitation	  on	  remedies	  for	  patent	  infringement	  against	  a	  governmental	  agency.77	   	   Under	   this	   provision,	   the	   NIH	   has	   the	   right	   to	   use	   and	  manufacture	   any	   patented	   invention	   regardless	   of	   whether	   it	   was	  developed	  with	   federal	   funding.78	   	   Further,	   the	   NIH	   can	   use	   the	   patent	  without	  a	  license,	  although	  it	  is	  subject	  to	  limited	  liability	  for	  doing	  so.79	  	  Specifically,	  the	  provision	  states:	  [w]henever	  an	  invention	  described	  in	  and	  covered	  by	  a	  patent	  of	  the	   United	   States	   is	   used	   or	   manufactured	   by	   or	   for	   the	   United	  States	  without	  license	  of	  the	  owner	  thereof	  or	  lawful	  right	  to	  use	  or	  manufacture	   the	   same,	   the	  owner’s	   remedy	  shall	  be	  by	  action	  against	   the	   United	   States	   in	   the	   United	   States	   Court	   of	   Federal	  Claims	  for	  the	  recovery	  of	  his	  reasonable	  and	  entire	  compensation	  for	  such	  use	  and	  manufacture.80	  A	  recent	  example	  of	  this	  right	  being	  asserted	  by	  the	  NIH	  was	  on	  June	  17,	  2011.81	  	  The	  NIH	  granted	  Jackson	  Laboratory	  “with	  the	  government’s	  authorization	  and	  consent	  .	  .	  .	  to	  all	  use	  and	  manufacture	  of	  any	  invention	  described	   in	   and	   covered	   by	   a	   United	   States	   patent.”82	   	   The	   NIH’s	  authority	  to	  allow	  Jackson	  Laboratory	  to	  continue	  using	  a	  patent	  that	  the	  Alzheimer’s	   Institute	   of	   American	   had	   claim	   over	   was	   from	   28	   U.S.C.	  section	  1498,	  which	  states:	  the	  use	  or	  manufacture	  of	  an	  invention	  described	  in	  and	  covered	  by	  a	  patent	  of	   the	  United	  States	  by	  a	  contractor,	  a	  subcontractor,	  or	  any	  person,	   firm	  or	   corporation	   for	   the	  Government	  and	  with	  authorization	  or	  consent	  of	  the	  Government,	  shall	  be	  construed	  as	  use	  or	  manufacture	  for	  the	  United	  States.83	  This	   right	   can	   be	   differentiated	   from	   other	   rights	   the	   NIH	   holds,	  specifically	  under	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act,	  in	  three	  ways.	  	  First,	  it	  provides	  the	  NIH	  with	   a	   compulsory	   license	   over	   all	  U.S.	   patents.84	   	   Thus,	   its	   right	   is	  not	   limited	   to	   whether	   the	   federal	   agency	   provided	   the	   funding	   and	  
 77. 	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1498	  (2006).	  78. 	  See	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1498	  (2006).	  79. 	  Id.	  80. 	  28	  USC	  §	  1498(a)	  (2006).	  81. 	  See	  supra	  Introduction.	  82. 	  Letter	  from	  Francis	  S.	  Collins,	  supra	  note	  6.	  83. 	  28	  USC	  §	  1498	  (2006).	  84. 	   REPORT	   OF	   THE	   NIH	  WORKING	   GROUP	   ON	   RESEARCH	   TOOLS,	   ANALYSIS	   OF	   NIH	   OPTIONS	  UNDER	  CURRENT	  LAW,	  PRESENTED	  TO	  THE	  ADVISORY	  COMMITTEE	  TO	  THE	  DIRECTOR	  (1998).	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further,	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  a	  specific	  funding	  agency.	  	  Second,	  the	  provision	  requires	   that	   the	   government	   pay	   a	   reasonable	   compensation	   to	   the	  patent	  holder.85	   	  This	   is	  particularly	   important	  to	  note	  because	  it	  can	  be	  costly	   to	   the	   government	   when	   implemented.	   	   Thus,	   it	   is	   a	   rare	  occurrence	  when	   the	   government	   steps	   in,	   and	   this	   power	   is	   only	   used	  when	  it	  is	  essential	  because	  a	  license	  is	  not	  otherwise	  available.	  	  Further,	  seldom	   does	   the	   need	   outweigh	   the	   cost.	   	   Third,	   as	   exemplified	   by	   the	  Jackson	  Laboratory	  case,	  the	  NIH	  is	  able	  to	  authorize	  and	  consent	  to	  the	  use	   of	   a	   patent	   on	   behalf	   of	   third	   parties.	   	   The	   NIH	   believes	   that	  “[r]esearchers,	   patients,	   and	   caregivers	   look	   to	   the	   NIH	   to	   support	   the	  development	   and	   dissemination/sharing	   of	   critical	   research	   resources	  and	   to	   pursue	   aggressively	   new	   insights	   and	   innovative	   therapies	   to	  alleviate	   suffering.”86	   	   The	   NIH	   weighed	   the	   costs	   of	   intervening	   and	  granting	  Jackson	  Laboratory	  a	  compulsory	  license	  with	  the	  public	  benefit,	  and	  the	  public	  benefit	  won	  because,	   it	   is	   “critical	   to	   the	  advancement	  of	  our	  understanding	  of	  Alzheimer’s	  disease	  and	  to	  the	  development	  of	  new	  diagnostics	   and	   treatments.”87	   	   Therefore,	   the	   broad	   authority	   that	   the	  government	  granted	   the	  NIH	  within	   the	  patent	   realm	  has	  proven	  useful	  and	  has	  been	  utilized	  to	  primarily	  benefit	  the	  public.	  
B.	  	  The	  Passage	  of	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act	  Most	  government	   investment	   into	  patent	   research	  and	  development	  produced	  only	  a	  small	  percentage	  of	  what	  was	  reaching	  consumers	  in	  the	  market.88	  	  Prior	  to	  the	  Act,	  the	  government	  held	  onto	  patent	  rights,	  which	  tended	   to	   frustrate	   the	   private	   industry,	   and	   often	   it	   had	   no	   reason	   or	  incentive	   to	   invest	   in	   research.89	   	   The	   belief	   by	   Congress	   was	   that	   the	  “government	   typically	   funds	   the	   inspiration	   [while	   the]	   industry	   the	  perspiration.”90	   	  At	  a	   time	  when	   the	  United	  States	  was	  concerned	  about	  the	   country’s	   technological	   competitiveness	   in	   the	   global	   arena,	  legislation	   that	   finally	   addressed	   these	   concerns	   and	  unified	   the	   federal	  government’s	  patent	  authority	  was	  necessary.	   	  The	  Act	  allows	  inventors	  to	   retain	   title	   to	   inventions	   that	   are	   the	   result	   of	   federally	   funded	  research.	   	  Subsequently,	   it	  allows	  them	  to	  license	  their	  inventions	  to	  the	  
 85. 	  Id.	  86. 	  Letter	  from	  Francis	  S.	  Collins,	  supra	  note	  6.	  87. 	  Id.	  88. 	   See	   Rachael	   A.	   Ream,	   Nonprofit	   Commercialization	   Under	   Bayh-­‐Dole	   and	   the	  
Academic	  Anticommons,	  58	  CASE	  W.	  RES.	  1343,	  1355	  (2008).	  89. 	  April	  L.	  Butler,	  Stealing	  Thunder	  From	  Government	  Contractors:	  Thwarting	  the	  Intent	  
of	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act	  in	  Campbell	  Plastics	  v.	  Brownlee,	  31	  DAYTON	  L.	  REV.	  477,	  491	  (2006).	  90. 	  Statement	  of	  Senator	  Birch	  Bayh	  to	  the	  National	  Institutes	  of	  Health,	  May	  25,	  2004,	  
available	  at	  http://ott.od.nih.gov/Meeting/Senator-­‐Birch-­‐Bayh.pdf.	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private	   market	   to	   facilitate	   commercialization.91	   	   The	   Act	   contains	   two	  salient	  rights	  that	  the	  government	  retained	  to	  make	  sure	  patent	  owners	  use	  government-­‐sponsored	  inventions	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  public.	  	  This	  Comment	  will	   discuss	   these	   rights	   specifically	  within	   the	   context	   of	   the	  NIH	  and	  its	  patent	  authority.	  	  IV.	  	  BOARD	  OF	  TRUSTEES	  OF	  THE	  LELAND	  STANFORD	  JUNIOR	  UNIVERSITY	  V.	  ROCHE	  MOLECULAR	  SYSTEMS,	  INC.	  The	   American	   federal	   court	   system	   has	   recently	   heard	   a	   number	   of	  public	  health	  patent	  cases	  that	  seem	  to	  be	  reigniting	  the	  debate	  regarding	  who	  should	   retain	  patent	  ownership.92	   	  Although	  each	   case	  addresses	  a	  slightly	   different	   public	   health	   viewpoint,	   there	   is	   an	   underlying	   theme	  that	   courts	   are	  wary	   of	   patents	   that	   affect	   the	   public	  when	   kept	   in	   the	  hands	  of	   the	  private	   sector.	   	  One	  of	   the	  principles	   of	   the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act	  and	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   debates	  was	   retaining	   government	   ownership	   of	   a	  patent	  when	  it	  was	  beneficial	  to	  the	  public.	  	  Last	  year,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  addressed	  this	   issue	  when	  it	  decided	  the	  Board	  of	  Trustees	  of	  the	  Leland	  
Stanford	   Junior	   University	   v.	   Roche	   Molecular	   Systems,	   Inc.	   (“Stanford	   v.	  
Roche”).	  When	  an	  invention	  is	  conceived,	  it	  is	  generally	  presumed	  to	  be	  owned	  by	   the	   inventor	   under	   U.S.	   patent	   law.93	   	   The	   case	   of	   Stanford	   v.	   Roche	  addressed	   the	   issue	   of	   patent	   ownership	   in	   the	   context	   of	   federally	  funded	   research.94	   	   The	   issue	   brought	   before	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   was	  whether,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  federally	  funded	  research,	  the	  ownership	  of	  the	  invention	   first	   arises	  with	   the	   federal	   contractor	   (i.e.,	   Stanford)	   or	  with	  the	   inventor	   under	   the	   Bayh-­‐Dole	   Act.95	   Further,	   the	   Court	   discussed	  whether	   the	   inventor	   can	   interfere	   with	   that	   right	   by	   assigning	   the	  invention	  to	  a	  third	  party.96	  	  Addressing	  this	  issue	  was	  significant	  because	  a	   large	   part	   of	   the	   debate	   prior	   to	   the	   passage	   of	   the	   Bayh-­‐Dole	   Act	  focused	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  patent	  ownership	  and	  who	  holds	  that	  right.	  In	   general,	   allowing	   a	   person	   to	   retain	   ownership	   of	   a	   patent	   is	  considered	  a	  strong	  right.	   	  For	  example,	  ownership	  of	  a	  patent	  gives	  the	  
 91. 	  BAYH-­‐DOLE	  ACT,	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  202	  (2006).	  	  	  92. 	   For	   example,	   Lab.	   Corp.	   v.	   Metabolite	   Labs.	   Inc.,	   548	   U.S.	   124,	   (2006);	   Ass’n	   for	  Molecular	   Pathology	   v.	   United	   States	   Patent	   and	   Trademark	  Office,	   653	   F.3d	   1329	   (Fed.	   Cir.	  2011).	  	  	  93. 	   35	   U.S.C.	   section	   101	   states:	   “[w]hoever	   invents	   or	   discovers	   a	   new	   and	   useful	  [invention]	  may	  obtain	  a	  patent.”	  94. 	  See	  Bd.	  of	  Trs.	  v.	  Roche	  Molecular	  Sys.,	  131	  S.	  Ct.	  2188	  (2011).	  95. 	  35	  U.S.C.	  §§	  200–212	  (2011).	  96. 	  Bd.	  of	  Trs.	  v.	  Roche	  Molecular	  Sys.,	  131	  S.	  Ct.	  2188,	  2196	  (2011).	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patent	  owner	  the	  right	  to	  exclude	  others	  from	  making,	  using,	  offering	  for	  sale,	  selling,	  or	  importing	  into	  the	  United	  States	  the	  invention	  claimed	  in	  the	  patent.97	  	  Thus,	  holding	  that	  one	  party	  has	  the	  right	  over	  another	  has	  strong	  implications	  that	  can	  offset	  the	  carefully	  balanced	  interests	  of	  the	  public	   and	   private	   sectors;	   a	   balance	   already	   in	   place	   to	   further	   patent	  innovation.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  held	   in	  Stanford	  v.	  Roche	   that	  an	   inventor	   is	  still	  presumed	   to	   be	   the	   owner	   of	   a	   patent	   when	   the	   patent	   resulted	   from	  federally	   funded	   research.98	   	   The	   Supreme	   Court	   specifically	   addressed	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  the	  ownership	  of	  the	  invention	  automatically	  arises	  with	   the	   federal	   contractor	   or	   with	   the	   individual	   inventor	   within	   the	  context	  of	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act.99	  	  Further,	  the	  majority	  opinion	  held	  that	  an	  inventor	  could	  even	  assign	  an	  invention	  to	  a	  third	  party.100	  	  The	  majority	  discerns	  that	  this	  viewpoint	  falls	  in	  line	  with	  the	  original	  intent	  of	  the	  bill	  and	   is	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   the	   government	   should	   view	   patent	  ownership.101	  In	   contrast,	   Justice	   Breyer,	   along	   with	   Justice	   Ginsburg,	   wrote	   an	  extensive	  dissenting	  opinion	  that	  disagreed	  with	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts.102	  	  Specifically,	   Justice	  Breyer	  contended	  that	  the	  Court’s	  holding	  turned	  on	  matters	   that	   were	   not	   fully	   briefed	   in	   the	   majority	   opinion.103	   	   More	  importantly	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   Comment,	   the	   dissenting	   opinion	  discusses	   an	   interesting	   viewpoint	   that	   the	   public	   interest	   is	   lost	  when	  ownership	  is	  transferred.	  Interestingly,	  his	  argument	  largely	  parallels	  the	  post–World	  War	  II	  national	  debates	  prior	  to	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act.	  Justice	   Breyer	   begins	   his	   dissent	   by	   discussing	   the	   age-­‐old	   debate	  over	  patents	  and	  their	  effectiveness	  in	  promoting	  innovation.	  	  He	  quotes	  two	  of	  America’s	  founding	  fathers,	  Thomas	  Jefferson	  and	  James	  Madison,	  who	  were	  both	  concerned	  about	  “the	  difficulty	  of	  drawing	  a	  line	  between	  the	   things	   which	   are	   worth	   it	   to	   the	   public,	   the	   embarrassment	   of	   an	  exclusive	   patent,	   and	   those	   which	   are	   not.”104	   	   Thus,	   allowing	   a	   patent	  owner	   to	   have	   a	   “monopoly”	   interest	   was	   “compensation”	   for	   the	  
 97. 	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  154(a)(1)	  (2006).	  98. 	  Bd.	  of	  Trs.,	  131	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2188.	  99. 	  Id.	  at	  2189.	  100. Id.	  at	  2193.	  101. Id.	  at	  2203.	  102. Chief	   Justice	   Roberts	   delivered	   the	   opinion	   of	   the	   court	   in	   which	   Justices	   Scalia,	  Kennedy,	   Thomas,	   Alito,	   Sotomayor,	   and	   Kagan	   joined.	   	   Justice	   Sotomayor	   filed	   a	   separate	  concurring	  opinion.	  	  103. 	  Bd.	  of	  Trs.,	  131	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2200.	  104. 	  Id.	  at	  2200.	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community’s	  “benefit.”	  	  Justice	  Breyer	  explained:	  the	  importance	  of	  assuring	  this	  community	  ‘benefit’	  is	  reflected	  in	  legal	  rules	  that	  may	  deny	  or	  limit	  the	  award	  of	  patent	  rights	  where	  the	  public	  has	  already	  paid	  to	  produce	  an	  invention,	  lest	  the	  public	  bear	   the	   potential	   costs	   of	   patent	   protection	   where	   there	   is	   no	  offsetting	  need	  for	  such	  protection	  to	  elicit	  that	  invention.105	  This	  point	  is	  alleging	  that,	  since	  the	  public	  pays	  taxes	  that	  contribute	  in	   part	   to	   federal	   patent	   grants,	   the	   public	   has	   a	   stake	   in	   patents,	   and	  their	   interests	   should	   not	   be	   outweighed	   for	   the	   sake	   of	  commercialization	  and	  profit.106	  	  	  V.	  	  RATIONALIZING	  THE	  DISCUSSION	  RAISED	  IN	  JUSTICE	  BREYER’S	  DISSENTING	  OPINION	  The	  United	  States	  Constitution	  states,	  in	  Article	  I,	  Section	  8,	  Clause	  8,	  that	  “Congress	  Shall	  Have	  Power	  .	  .	  .	  To	  promote	  the	  Progress	  of	  Science	  and	  useful	  Arts,	  by	  securing	   for	   limited	  Times	   to	  Authors	  and	   Inventors	  the	   exclusive	   Right	   to	   their	   respective	   Writings	   and	   discoveries.”107	  	  Essential	   to	   the	   definition	   of	   Congress’	   authority	   to	   promote	   patents	   is	  the	  underlying	  right	  of	  the	  public	  to	  access	  the	  innovation.108	  	  Further,	  the	  U.S.	  patent	  system	   is	  often	  referred	   to	  as	   “a	  social	   contract	  between	   the	  inventor	  and	  society	  that	  encourages	  innovation	  and	  promotes	  increased	  knowledge	   in	   the	  public	  domain.”109	   	   Justice	  Breyer’s	  dissenting	  opinion	  in	   Stanford	   v.	   Roche	   discusses	   this	   underlying	   right	   of	   the	   public	   in	   the	  context	  of	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act	  and	  ownership	  rights.	  110	  	  His	  concerns	  lie	  in	  the	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  rights	  from	  the	  initial	  recipient	  of	  federal	  funds	  to	  a	  third	  party.	  	  And	  further,	  whether	  this	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  defeats	  the	  purpose	  behind	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act	  ultimately	  defeating	  the	  benefit	  to	  the	  community.111	  
 105. 	  Id.	  at	  2200–01.	  106. 	   See	  KALI	  MURRAY,	   A	   POLITICS	   OF	   PATENT	   LAW:	   CRAFTING	   THE	   PARTICIPATORY	   PATENT	  BARGAIN	  (Routledge	  Press	  2012).	  107. 	  U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	  I	  §	  8.	  108. 	   Cynthia	  Ho,	  Patents,	   Patients,	   and	   Public	   Policy:	   An	   Incomplete	   Intersection	   at	   35	  
U.S.C.	  §	  287(c),	  33	  U.C.	  DAVIS	  L.	  REV.	  601,	  610,	  (2000);	  See	  Stephen	  W.	  Chen,	  Marina	  Len,	  &	  Seth	  D.	  Levy,	  Patent	  Protection	  in	  Medicine	  and	  Biotechnology:	  An	  Overview,	  	  4	  J.	  HEALTH	  &	  LIFE	  SCI.	  L.	  106	  (2011).	  109. 	  Id.	  at	  60.	  110. 	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  article,	  the	  author	  is	  narrowing	  her	  argument	  to	  focus	  on	  solely	  the	  “public	  interest”	  analysis	  mentioned	  in	  Justice	  Breyer’s	  dissent	  and	  will	  not	  address	  the	  larger	  issues	  presented	  in	  the	  majority	  and	  dissenting	  opinion.	  	  	  	  111. 	   Because	   the	   public	   has	   already	   “paid”	   for	   the	   patent	   through	   federal	   funding,	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This	  Section	  will	   argue	   that	   the	  public’s	   interest	   in	  patents	   invented	  with	  federal	  funding	  is	  lost	  when	  an	  ownership	  interest	  vests	  beyond	  the	  initial	   recipient	   of	   the	   federal	   funding;	   thus,	   validating	   Justice	   Breyer’s	  viewpoint.	  	  This	  Comment	  will	  first	  argue	  that	  key	  policy	  debates	  prior	  to	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act	  sought	  to	  preserve	  a	  balance	  between	  private	  and	  public	  interests.	  	  One	  solution	  to	  this	  balance	  of	  interests	  was	  to	   maintain	   the	   interest	   of	   investors	   by	   allowing	   them	   to	   retain	  ownership	  of	   title	   to	  a	  patent.	  Thus,	  allowing	  ownership	   to	  vest	  beyond	  the	   initial	   investor	   or	   recipient	   of	   federal	   funding	   defeats	   the	   purpose	  underlying	   the	   passage	   of	   the	   bill.112	   	   Second,	   in	   lieu	   of	   the	   majority	  opinion	   clearly	   setting	   precedent	   for	   patent	   ownership	   in	   future	  litigation,	   this	   Section	   will	   offer	   Justice	   Breyer	   a	   case	   study	   of	   a	  government	  agency	  currently	  maintaining	  a	  balance	  of	  interests	  between	  investors	  ownership	  rights	  and	  the	  public	  domain.	   	  This	  section	  will	  use	  the	  National	   Institutes	   of	  Health	   as	   an	   example	   of	   how	   the	   government	  asserts	   its	   authority	   to	   intervene	   in	   the	  patent	  process	  when	   the	  public	  interest	   is	   at	   stake,	   while	   remaining	   cognizant	   of	   private	   sector	  interests.113	  
A.	  	  Allowing	  Ownership	  of	  Title	  to	  Vest	  beyond	  a	  Federally	  Funded	  Investor	  
Could	  Tip	  the	  Scale	  The	  current	  patent	  ownership	  arrangement	   is	  a	   strategic	  attempt	   to	  balance	   the	   interests	   of	   federally	   funded	   private	   investors	   with	   the	  interests	   of	   the	  public.	   	   Veering	   from	   this	   balance	   could	   tip	   the	   scale	   in	  the	  wrong	  direction.	  	  Patent	  investment	  would	  be	  at	  stake.	  Furthermore,	  it	   is	  clear	  that	  from	  the	  significant	  policy	  debates,	  outlined	  in	  Section	  1C	  of	  this	  Comment,	  that	  the	  government	  had	  a	  difficult	  time	  structuring	  the	  current	   system	   (where	   the	   government	   and	   the	   private	   sector	  successfully	  continue	  to	  innovate	  and	  develop	  patents).	  One	   of	   the	  major	   debates	   prior	   to	   the	   passage	   of	   the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act	  was	  how	  to	  balance	  the	  interests	  of	  individuals	  who	  retain	  ownership	  of	  the	   patent.	   	   The	   only	   way	   to	   encourage	   the	   private	   sector	   to	   further	  innovate	   was	   to	   have	   title	   to	   the	   patent	   vest	   in	   the	   initial	   recipient	   of	  
 Justice	  Breyer	  is	  concerned	  that	  any	  interest	  the	  public	  might	  have	  in	  vesting	  ownership	  of	  the	  patent	   is	   lost	   when	   the	   transfer	   of	   the	   patent	   to	   a	   third	   party	   no	   longer	   ensures	   that	   the	  government	  can	  intervene	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  public’s	  interest,	  per	  statutory	  authority.	  112. 	  See	  Benjamin	  K.	   Sovacool,	  Placing	  a	  Glove	  on	   the	   Invisible	  Hand:	  How	   Intellectual	  
Property	  Rights	  May	  Impede	  Innovation	  in	  Energy	  Research	  and	  Development	  (R&D),	  18	  ALB.	  L.J.	  SCI.	  &	  TECH.	  381,	  401	  (2008).	  113. 	   The	   author	   chose	   the	  National	   Institutes	   of	  Health	   as	   an	   example	   because	   of	   its	  unique	   history	   of	  maintaining	   the	   private	   sector’s	   interest	   in	   patent	   development	  while	   also	  intervening	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  public	  when	  necessary.	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federal	  funding.114	  	  Allowing	  title	  to	  vest	  in	  private	  ownership,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  government,	  has	  proven	  exponentially	  beneficial	  to	  facilitating	  the	  innovation	   of	   patents.115	   	   For	   example,	   “[t]he	   Director	   of	   Stanford	  University’s	   Office	   of	   Technology	   Licensing	  .	  .	  .	   noted	   that	   exclusivity	   is	  what	   motivates	   firms	   to	   invest	   financial	   and	   human	   resources	   in	  technology	  development.”116	   	  Why	  else	  would	  the	  private	  sector	  want	  to	  invest	   its	   resources	   and	   technology	   into	   developing	   patents	   that	   could	  potentially	  take	  years	  to	  come	  to	  fruition?	  	  It	  is	  clear,	  simply	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  number	  of	  patents	  that	  are	  now	  developed	  by	  the	  private	  sector	  that	  patent	   innovation	   would	   come	   to	   a	   halt	   if	   not	   for	   this	   motivation.	   	   In	  1980,	  universities	  were	  awarded	  only	  390	  patents.	   	  By	  contrast	  in	  2008,	  universities	  were	  awarded	  3,042	  patents,	  a	  significant	  increase.117	  Even	   though	   the	   private	   sector	   has	   ownership	   rights	   to	   the	   patent,	  this	   arrangement	   for	   patent	   ownership	   rights	   eventually	   benefits	   the	  public	   as	  well.	   	   This	   is	  due	   to	   the	  underlying	  purpose	  behind	   the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	   Act,	   which	   is	   to	   effortlessly	   transition	   the	   results	   of	   government	  funded	   research	   into	   a	   benefit,	   in	   part,	   for	   the	   public	   domain.118	   	   By	  increasing	   the	   commercialization	   of	   patents	   the	   public	   is	   able	   to	   use	  information	   and	   technology	   that	   might	   never	   have	   reached	   the	   public	  domain.	  The	   government	   strongly	   considered	   whether	   more	   needed	   to	   be	  done	   to	   keep	   an	   equal	   balance	   of	   interests	   instead	   of	   one	   that	   heavily	  favored	  the	  private	  sector.119	  	  Many	  were	  worried	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  could	  simply	  use	  government,	  and	  essentially	  tax	  payer	  funds,	  to	  facilitate	  patent	   innovation	  and	   then	  keep	  all	   the	  profits	   once	   the	  patent	  became	  lucrative.120	   	  One	  concept	  that	  would	  alleviate	  this	  concern	  was	  the	   idea	  of	   recouping	   government	   funds	   once	   the	   patent	   became	   profitable.121	  	  Thus,	   “recoupment	   is	   based	   upon	   the	   argument	   that	   the	   government	  should	  be	  reimbursed	   for	  research	  and	  development	  expenses	  provided	  
 114. 	  See	  April	  L.	  Butler,	  Stealing	  Thunder	  From	  Government	  Contractors:	  Thwarting	  the	  
Intent	   of	   the	   Bayh-­‐Dole	   Act	   in	   Campbell	   Plastics	   v.	   Brownlee,	   31	   DAYTON	   L.	   REV.	   477,	   490–91	  (2006).	  115. 	  United	  States	  General	  Accounting	  Office,	  Technology	  Transfer:	  Administration	  of	  the	  
Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act	  by	  Research	  Universities,	  RCED-­‐98-­‐126,	  May	  1998,	  2.	  116. 	  SCHACHT,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  9.	  117. 	  WENDY	  H.	  SCHACHT,	  CONG.	  RESEARCH	  SERV.,	  RL	  32324,	  FEDERAL	  R&D,	  DRUG	  DISCOVERY,	  AND	  PRICING:	  INSIGHTS	  FROM	  THE	  NIH-­‐UNIVERSITY-­‐INDUSTRY	  RELATIONSHIP,	  16–17	  (2011);	  see	  Risa	  L.	   Lieberwitz,	  Education	   Law:	   The	   Corporatization	   of	   Academic	  Research:	  Whose	   Interests	   Are	  
Served?,	  38	  AKRON	  L.	  REV.	  759,	  764–65	  (2005).	  118. 	  Butler,	  supra	  note	  89.	  	  119. 	  SCHACHT,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  14.	  120. 	  Id.	  	  121. 	  Id.	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to	   a	   contractor	   if	   the	   resulting	   product	   is	   brought	   to	   the	   market	   and	  generates	  profits.”122	  In	  theory,	  this	  concept	  makes	  sense.	   	  The	  government	  is	   investing	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  with	  taxpayer	  dollars	  and	  should	  be	  reimbursed	  once	  the	   investment	   reaches	   profitability,	   especially	   considering	   the	   number	  of	  other	  strong	  patent	  rights	  the	  owner	  receives.123	  	  However,	  in	  practice,	  recoupment	  cuts	  at	  the	  very	  reason	  the	  private	  sector	  is	  willing	  to	  invest	  in	   patent	   innovation.	   	   The	   “economic	   incentive	   to	   realize	   a	   return	   on	  investment	  provided	  by	  a	  patent	   is	  necessary	  to	  stimulate	  companies	  to	  provide	   the	   often	   substantial	   financial	   commitment	   to	   turn	   federally-­‐funded	   R&D	   into	  marketable	   technologies	   and	   techniques.”124	   	   Further,	  the	  government	  realized	  there	  was	  an	  anticipated	  return	  on	  investment,	  for	  the	  public	  benefit,	  through	  “increased	  revenues	  from	  taxes	  on	  profits,	  new	   jobs	   created,	   improved	   productivity	   and	   [overall]	   economic	  growth.”125	   	   Thus,	   the	   government	   strongly	   considered	   adding	  recoupment	   provisions	   to	   the	   Bayh-­‐Dole	   Act.	   	   However,	   the	   larger	  implications	   and	   increased	   burden	   that	   it	   would	   place	   on	   stifling	  innovation	  outweighed	  any	  benefit	  the	  concept	  would	  bring.126	  The	   government	   carefully	   crafted	   the	   current	   arrangement	   where	  patent	  ownership	  vests	  in	  the	  initial	  recipient	  of	  federal	  funds.	  	  Therefore,	  allowing	   title	   to	   vest	   beyond	   the	   initial	   recipient	   of	   federal	   funds	   is	   an	  inaccurate	   assumption	   of	   the	   purpose	   behind	   the	   passage	   of	   the	   Bayh-­‐Dole	   Act	   and	   could	   result	   in	   a	   disincentive	   for	   the	   private	   sector	   to	  continue	  to	  invest.	  
B.	  	  The	  National	  Institutes	  of	  Health:	  What	  Are	  They	  Doing	  Right?	  The	  majority	  opinion	  in	  Stanford	  v.	  Roche	  held	  that	  ownership	  rights	  stem	   initially	   from	   the	   inventor	   instead	   of	   the	   initial	   recipient	   of	  government	   funding,	   i.e.	   often	   times	   the	   university.127	   	   This	   Comment	  argues	   that	   this	   interpretation	  was	   not	   the	   intent	   of	   the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act,	  and	  ultimately	  agrees	  with	  and	  validates	  Justice	  Breyer’s	  dissent.128	  	  The	  
 122. 	  Id.	  123. 	  See	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  261	  (2002)	  (Patent	  protection	  offers	  the	  patent	  owner	  twenty	  years	  ownership	  from	  the	  filing	  of	  a	  patent	  application,	  protection	  against	  independent	  invention	  or	  reverse	  engineering,	  and	  protection	  against	  any	  similar	  or	  identical	  device.).	  	  124. SCHACHT,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  14.	  125. Id.	  at	  15.	  126. See	  Bernadette	  M.	  Broccolo,	  Today's	  Conflict	  of	  Interest	  Compliance	  Challenge:	  How	  
Do	  We	  Balance	  the	  Commitment	  to	  Integrity	  with	  the	  Demand	  for	  Innovation?	  1	  J.	  HEALTH	  &	  LIFE	  SCI.	  L.	  4	  (2008).	  127. See	  Bd.	  of	  Trs.,	  131	  S.	  Ct.	  2188.	  128. See	  id.	  at	  2200.	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majority’s	   interpretation	   of	   the	   Bayh-­‐Dole	   Act	   will	   pose	   challenges	   for	  future	   recipients	   of	   government	   funding	   hoping	   to	   invest	   in	   patent	  innovation	  and	  could	  possibly	  stifle	  future	  innovation.	  	  This	  Section	  offers	  an	  example	  of	  how	  the	  government	  plays,	  and	  already	  is	  playing,	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  maintaining	  the	  balance	  of	  public	  and	  private	  interests,	  even	  if	  the	  courts	  have	  chosen	   to	   tip	   this	  balance	   in	   favor	  of	  private	   interests.	   	  The	  NIH	  is	  an	  excellent	  example	  of	  how	  a	  government	  agency	  is	  balancing	  the	  interests	  of	   the	  public	  with	   the	   interests	  of	   the	  marketplace	   in	  order	   to	  foster	   patent	   development	   and	   innovation,	   precisely	   in	   the	   arena	   of	  patent	  ownership.	  The	   NIH	   is	   using	   its	   explicit	   authority	   under	   the	   Bayh-­‐Dole	   Act	   to	  protect	  the	  public	  when	  the	  private	  sector	  is	  inefficiently	  or	  ineffectively	  using	   federally	   funded	   inventions.129	   	   For	   example,	   as	   previously	  discussed,	   the	   “march-­‐in”	   right	   allows	   the	   NIH	   to	   intervene	   in	   the	  ownership	   rights	   of	   a	   private	   patent	   owner	  under	   certain	  discretionary	  guidelines.130	   	   If	   the	   patent	   owner	   is	   not	   using	   the	   patent	   in	   its	   best	  possible	  way,	  the	  government	  can	  exercise	  its	  march-­‐in	  rights	  and	  license	  the	  patent	  to	  another	  company.	  	  Essentially,	  “[m]arch-­‐in	  rights	  to	  protect	  the	   public’s	   interest	  were	   developed	   to	   take	   care	   of	   and	   address	  .	  .	  .	   [a]	  contractor’s	   windfall	   profits	  .	  .	  .	   and	   detrimental	   effects	   to	  competition.”131	   	  Thus,	   even	   though	   the	   courts	  have	   chosen	   to	   interpret	  the	   Bayh-­‐Dole	   Act’s	   ownership	   provisions	   in	   favor	   of	   private	   sector	  ownership,	   the	   government’s	   authority	   under	   the	   Act	   will	   maintain	   a	  balance	  of	  interests	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  public.	  The	  Act	  authorizes	  the	  Department	  of	  Commerce	  to	  create	  regulations	  to	   implement	   the	   provisions	   contained	   within	   the	   Act;	   this	   includes	  guideline	   procedures	   for	   agencies	   on	   how	   to	   assert	   their	   march-­‐in	  authority.132	  	  Although	  such	  procedures	  exist,	  they	  are	  often	  critiqued	  as	  being	   too	   “detailed	   and	   time-­‐consuming,	   and	   may	   make	   it	   difficult	   to	  initiate	  a	  march-­‐in	  proceeding.”133	  	  Others	  have	  stated	  “that	  the	  clause	  is	  just	  a	  ‘dummy	  clause’	  and	  [that]	  the	  government	  has	  no	  desire	  to	  ever	  use	  it.”134	  	  Moreover,	  no	  government	  agency	  has	  ever	  exercised	  any	  authority	  
 129. U.S.	   GOV’T	   ACCOUNTABILITY	  OFFICE,	   GAO-­‐09-­‐742,	   INFORMATION	   ON	   THE	  GOVERNMENT’S	  RIGHT	  TO	  ASSERT	  OWNERSHIP	  CONTROL	  OVER	  FEDERALLY	  FUNDED	  INVENTIONS	  2	  (2009);	  Arti	  K.	  Rai	  &	  Rebecca	   S.	   Eisenberg,	   The	   Public	   Domain:	   The	   Bayh-­‐Dole	   Reform	   and	   the	   Progress	   of	  
Biomedicine,	  66	  Law	  &	  Contemp.	  Prob.	  289,	  292–93	  (2003).	  130. See	  supra	  Section	  III	  B.	  131. Tina	  K.	  Stephen,	  Asian	  Initiatives	  on	  Bayh-­‐Dole,	  With	  Special	  Reference	  to	  India:	  How	  
Do	  We	  Make	  it	  More	  “Asian”?,10	  CHI.-­‐KENT	  J.	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  44,	  61	  (2010).	  132. Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act.	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  203	  (a)(1)	  (2002).	  133. U.S.	   GOV’T	   ACCOUNTABILITY	  OFFICE,	   GAO-­‐09-­‐742,	   INFORMATION	   ON	   THE	  GOVERNMENT’S	  RIGHT	  TO	  ASSERT	  OWNERSHIP	  CONTROL	  OVER	  FEDERALLY	  FUNDED	  INVENTIONS	  7	  (2009).	  134. Stephen,	  supra	  note	  131,	  at	  62.	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under	  march-­‐in	  rights,	  and	  further,	  the	  NIH	  has	  formally	  been	  petitioned	  to	   exercise	   this	   right	   on	   three	   separate	   occasions	   but	   each	   time	  determined	  it	  did	  not	  meet	  the	  statutory	  requirements.135	  As	  such,	  how	  is	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  public	  actually	  being	  protected	  by	  the	   government	  when	   the	  march-­‐in	   provision	   is	   commonly	   ridiculed	   as	  useless?	   	   The	   agencies	   believe	   quite	   the	   opposite	   and	   hold	   that	   the	  authority	   is	   highly	   valued,	   even	   without	   being	   exercised,	   “because,	  together	   with	   other	   tools,	   it	   provides	   them	   leverage	   to	   promote	  commercialization	  of	  federally	  funded	  inventions.”136	  	  Therefore,	  the	  NIH	  does	   not	   need	   to	   explicitly	   exercise	   march-­‐in	   rights	   because	   they	   are	  consistently	   looming	   as	   a	   bargaining	   chip	   in	   the	   background	   of	  negotiations,	   implementation	   procedures,	   and	   reporting	   requirements	  with	   private	   actors.137	   	   Furthermore,	   one	   anecdote	   commented	   on	   how	  the	  mere	  presence	  of	  the	  NIH	  in	  such	  discussions	  was	  enough	  leverage	  to	  encourage	   commercialization	   without	   actually	   exercising	   the	  authority.138	  In	   addition,	   the	   government	   heavily	   relies	   on	   the	   public	   to	   regulate	  and	   track	   federally-­‐funded	   inventions.	   	   The	   public	   is	  more	   apt	   to	   know	  sources	  of	  information	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  march-­‐in	  proceeding.	  	  Further,	  the	  NIH	  awards	  thousands	  of	  grants	  each	  year	  and	  “[m]onitoring	  such	  a	  large	   number	   of	   awards	   and	   institutions	   would	   be	   very	   resource	  intens[ive].”139	   	   To	   complicate	   the	   matter	   even	   more,	   grants	   can	   be	  licensed	  out	  for	  multiple	  uses	  and	  often	  are.	  This	  would	  pose	  significant	  problems	  for	  the	  government	  if	  it	  were	  to	  inquire	  about	  every	  contract	  or	  license	  agreement	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	  government	  should	  exercise	  its	  march-­‐in	  authority.140	  The	  NIH	  is	  effectively	  using	  the	  public	  as	  a	  resource	  in	  maintaining	  a	  balance	   of	   interests	   in	   the	   marketplace.	   	   Justice	   Breyer’s	   dissenting	  opinion	  in	  Stanford	  v.	  Roche	  is	  concerned	  with	  how	  the	  public’s	  interests	  will	   be	   offset	   given	   the	   implications	   of	   the	  majority	   opinion,	  which	   tips	  the	  interest	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  private	  sector.	  	  However,	  the	  NIH	  is	  utilizing	  its	  patent	   authority	   to	   effectuate	   the	   balance	   between	   the	   rights	   of	   the	  private	  sector	  with	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  public	  domain.	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VI.	  	  CONCLUSION	  The	  NIH	  holds	  salient	   rights	  within	   the	  patent	   realm	  that	  allow	   it	   to	  maintain	  a	  balance	  of	   interests	  between	   the	  public	   and	  private	  domain;	  namely,	  when	  patents	  affect	   the	  public	  health.	   	  This	  authority	  under	  the	  NIH	   directly	   addresses	   one	   of	   Justice	   Breyer’s	   main	   concerns	   in	   his	  dissenting	   opinion	   in	   Stanford	   v.	   Roche.	   	   Interestingly,	   Justice	   Breyer	  addresses	   a	   valid	   public	   policy	   concern	   that	   largely	   parallels	   the	   exact	  concerns	  legislators,	  private	  investors,	  small	  businesses,	  and	  universities	  discussed	   prior	   to	   the	   passage	   of	   the	   Bayh-­‐Dole	   Act	   and	   subsequent	  legislation.	  	  At	  that	  time,	  the	  government	  was	  concerned	  with	  facilitating	  an	  investment	  in	  research	  and	  development	  in	  patents	  without	  throwing	  the	   interests	   of	   the	   public	   out	   the	   window.141	   	   They	   carefully	   crafted	  legislation	   so	   that	   both	   interests	   would	   be	   best	   served;	   however,	   the	  Supreme	   Court	   now	   offsets	   this	   balance	   in	   the	   majority	   holding	   in	  
Stanford	  v.	  Roche.	   	  The	  holding	  interprets	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act’s	  ownership	  provisions	   so	   that	   they	  weigh	   slightly	   in	   favor	   of	   private	   interests	   over	  public	  interests.	  In	   lieu	   of	   the	   recent	   court	   decision,	   however,	   the	   government	   is	  adequately	  taking	  on	  the	  responsibility	  of	  maintaining	  a	  balance	  in	  favor	  of	   the	   public	   sector	   and	   will	   remain	   to	   do	   so.	   	   Many	   of	   the	   provisions	  under	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  grant	   the	  government	  authority	  to	   intervene	  on	  behalf	  of	   the	   public	   when	   their	   interests	   are	   at	   stake.	   	   Thus,	   although	   Justice	  Breyer	   holds	   a	   legitimate	   concern	   regarding	   the	  majority’s	   holding,	   his	  concern	   regarding	   whether	   there	   are	   adequate	   measures	   in	   place	   to	  protect	  the	  public’s	  interest	  are	  assuaged	  by	  specific	  agency	  practices	  and	  procedures	  outlined	  in	  this	  Comment.	  	  	   NIDA	  SHAKIR*	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